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Abstract
The financial condition of the state governments in India has been a cause for concern for
sometime now.  Over the years, the consolidated financial position of the state governments has shown a
marked deterioration in some of their major deficit indicators.  One of the fundamental weaknesses of
state government finances in India can be attributed to the increases in non- developmental expenditure,
particularly the revenue component of the non-developmental expenditure, and interest payments as a
proportion of revenue receipts.  Structural imbalances in the form of large revenue deficits, rising interest
burden, increasing distortions in the pattern of expenditure, and very slow growing non-tax revenues are
major problem areas for state finances.
These problems have been aggravated a great deal over the past few years because of a variety of
reasons.  The resource constraints in state finances have been accentuated by a near stagnant tax-GDP
ratio, rising share of non-developmental outlay in the total expenditure, large volumes of hidden or
implicit subsidies and increasing financial losses of state enterprises. A growing pressure on state finances
has also stemmed from the rising demand for public services.   Furthermore, the fiscal situation in the
states is likely to come under much greater pressure with the acceptance of the Report of the Fifth Pay
Commission by several state governments in India. Be that as it may, the critical problem in state finances
is not only one of high levels of expenditure, but also one of increasing distortions in the pattern of
expenditure.
The three different methods of intergovernmental fiscal transfers have resulted in an inefficien
transfer mechanism that has increased bureaucracy at the state level, accommodated numerous interest
groups, and delinked plan requirements of states from actual transfers.  Similarly, better fiscal
performance is not acknowledged with higher transfers, instead the gap filling approach of the Finance
Commission discourages fiscal discipline in the states.
In the area of expenditure reduction, we have identified  several potential areas for controlling
expenditure of the state governments.  In our view, by raising user charges on water in accordance with
the costs incurred in providing water, and aligning tariff  rates of the SEBs in line with their costs, the
state governments could significantly cut their budgetary losses.  In addition, a freeze on state government
employment can help save scarce resources to be used for productive purposes elsewhere in the states.
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Introduction:
The financial condition of the state governments in India has been a cause for concern for
sometime now.  Over the years, the consolidated financial position of the state governments has
shown a marked deterioration in some of their major deficit indicators.  One of the fundamental
weaknesses of state government finances in India can be attributed to the increases in non-
developmental expenditure, particularly the revenue component of the non-developmental
expenditure, and interest payments as a proportion of revenue receipts.  Structural imbalances in
the form of large revenue deficits1, r s ng interest burden, increasing distortions in the pattern of
expenditure, and very slow growing non-tax revenues are major problem areas for state finances.
Table 1 provides data on basic profile of Indian states, and figure 1 shows a map of India with
state boundaries.
These problems have been aggravated a great deal over the past few years because of a
variety of reasons.  The resource constraints in state finances have been accentuated by a near
stagnant tax-GDP ratio, rising share of non-developmental outlay in the total expenditure, large
volumes of hidden or implicit subsidies and increasing financial losses of state enterprises. A
growing pressure on state finances has also stemmed from the rising demand for public services.
Furthermore, the fiscal situation in the states is likely to come under much greater pressure with
the acceptance of the Report of the Fifth Pay Commission by several state governments in India.
The slow growth in revenue mobilization at the state level has posed serious difficulties for the
state governments to meet their expenditures.  Be that as it may, the critical problem in state
finances is not only one of high levels of expenditure, but also one of increasing distortions in the
pattern of expenditure as we would discuss in the section below.
Despite reduction in the ratio of state expenditure to GDP from 17 percent in 1990-91 to
16.6 per cent in 1996- 7 and further to 15.7 percent in 1997-98, signs of structural weaknesses
persist and therefore can be seen in the estimates of revenues and expenditures for 1997-98. The
revenue expenditure on non-developmental heads is expected to rise by about 20 per cent over an
increase of 14.8 percent in 1996-97; interest payments and administrative services would a count
for over 60 percent of the total increase in revenue expenditure in 1997-98. Partly as a result of
such inflexibility, revenue expenditure has increased from an average of around 11.3 percent of
GDP during the first half of 1990s to over 12.5 percent in 1997-98.  Further, states' tax revenue,
as a proportion of GDP in 1997-98, is likely to remain virtually stagnant at the level of 5.7
percent achieved in the second half of 1980s.  On the other hand, states' non-tax revenue, is
likely to decline to 1.6 percent of GDP in 1997-98 from the low level of 1.9 percent in 1996-97
due mainly to increase in implicit subsidies and largely negative or at best very low rates of
return on states' investment in public enterprises.
                                                          
1 The revenue deficit is the difference between revenue receipts and revenue expenditure.  In Indian budgetary
parlance, current expenditure is termed as revenue expenditure.
2The consolidated fiscal deficit of the states for 1997-98 is estimated at 2.9 percent of
GDP (Table 2). This has supposedly been financed to the extent of 51.3 percent via loans from
the center, and the remaining 48.7 percent through market borrowings and capital receipts of the
states (Table 3).  It may be noted here that loans from the center to the states constitute an
expenditure item in the central government’s budget, and thus are included in the center’s fiscal
deficit.  On the other hand, they constitute a financing source for states’ fiscal deficit.  The
impact of state fiscal deficit on the combined fiscal deficit of the center and the states is a
significant issue relating to state government finances2.  While a few selected budgetary
variables of the state governments (aggregate of all states) are shown in Table 4, state-wise
receipt and expenditure items as a proportion of net state domestic product (NSDP) are given in
Table 5. The gravity of the fiscal situation in the different states can also be assessed from the
data in Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c that show deterioration in state level finances.
The revenue deficits of the state governments have been rising since 1987-88.  Large and
persistent revenue deficits have implied diversion of high-cost borrowings for consumption
purposes, leading to a declining share of investment expenditures.  As a consequence, the
investment outlays of states as a ratio of GDP have declined from 2.8 percent in 1990-91 to 2.3
percent in 1996- 7 and further to 2.2 percent in 1997-98.  An expenditure pattern of this type has
had, and continues to have, wide ranging implications, such as for the adequacy and quality of
infrastructure, given the scarcity of resources for fresh investment as well as for maintenance of
capital assets.
The aggregate revenue deficit of all state governments for 1996-97 was placed at Rs. 156
billion or 1.2 percent of GDP, and the same for 1997-98 is marginally lower at Rs. 125 billion or
0.9 percent of GDP.  In particular, high fiscal deficit of the states is primarily on account of five
states.  These are Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala.
Together they account for as much as 85.6 percent of the consolidated revenue deficit of the
states.  A very high proportion of the fiscal deficit is caused by revenue deficit for the states of
Uttar Pradesh (69.8 percent), Kerala (51.9 percent), Tamil Nadu (49.8 percent), Punjab (45.1
percent), and West Bengal (42.3 percent).  In these states, a major portion of the borrowings is
pre-empted in financing the current expenditure, which naturally affects the quantum of
resources available for developmental capital outlay.  On the other hand, Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh are two states where the increase in fiscal deficit, to a large extent, is due to a
greater level of developmental expenditures.
Although the debt burden of states in relation to GDP has remained fairly stable at around
20 percent, (refer to Table 3) the interest payment burden has shown a steady rise from an
average of 11 percent in the second half of the 1980s to 16.9 percent in 1996-97, and is estimated
to rise further to 17.7 percent in 1997-98. While this ncrease is partly attributable to the market
orientation of state borrowings and reduction in the interest subsidies on central government
loans, the downward rigidity in the state debt to GDP ratio has precluded the possibility of any
offsetting adjustment in the incremental debt to contain the interest burden.
                                                          
2 The interrelationship between the center and state fiscal deficits is evident from the inter-governmental loan
transfer between these two tiers of the government.
3A shift of policy focus towards changing the pattern of resource allocation and improving
the resource base of states is critical for improving the state of State finances given the current
situation.  While efforts to introduce state level VAT and other tax reform measures have begun,
their implementation across all states is necessary in order to enhance the revenue productivity of
the state tax system and to reduce its distortionary implications for the economy.
Expenditure adjustment at the state level should take into account its implications for the
critical sectors such as social services. A significant portion of the expenditure on social services
comes under the purview of the state governments, because of the federal set-up of th
constitution, which places the responsibility of undertaking human resource development
primarily on the state government. The social service expenditure of the state governments as a
percentage to GDP showed a rising trend during the 1980s, from 4.8 percent of GDP in 1980-81
to 5.6 percent in 1990- 1.  In the first half of 1990s, however, there was a decline in the ratio
owing to the resource crunch faced by a number of states.  It came down to 5.3 percent in
1992-93 and further to 5.1 percent in 1994-95 and remained thereafter in the range of 5.1 to 5.5
percent.
A significant portion of social service expenditure is appropriated by education, which
followed a trend similar to that of the total social services; it was 2.3 percent of GDP in 1980-81
(excluding loans and advances) and rose to 3.0 percent in 1990-91, but came down to 2.9 percent
in 1995-96 and remained more or less stagnant thereafter.  Expenditure on medical public health
and family welfare revealed a declining trend in the 1980s and the early 1990s. It was 1.2 percent
of GDP in 1980-81, fell to 0.9 percent in 1990-91 and since then has stayed below 1.0 percent.
For data on social and economic service expenditure, refer to Table 6.
The development of human resources for an all-rou d development of the economy is
extremely essential.  Efforts must therefore be made not only to increase the level of outlay on
social services, but also to ensure a proper end-use of these expenditures. Given the deterioration
in the overall fiscal situation of state governments, sustaining an improvement in the social
sector expenditures would entail efforts to recover a reasonable part of the cost and to raise
additional resources for financing these expenditures.  A viable public expenditure policy would
also need to be pursued, taking into account the explicit and implicit subsidy burden on state
finances, and their implied distributional impact.  While subsidies need to be targeted to the
desired sections of society, a system of proper pricing of public utilities should go hand in hand
with redistributive policies in order to improve the states' resource base.
The central government brought out a discussion paper in May 1997 on Government
Subsidies in India, which provides a comprehensive estimate of the explicit and implicit
subsidies. The paper reports that the total magnitude of subsidies given by central and state
government was Rs.1373 billion during 1994-95 constituting 14.4 percent of GDP, comprising
Rs.430 billion of central subsidies and Rs.942 billion of state subsidies. The subsidies of center
and states on non-merit goods and services (such as agriculture and allied activities, irrigation,
power, industries, transport etc.) amounted to 10.7 percent of GDP. Data on statewise merit and
non-merit subsidies is given in Table 7.  The average all-India current recovery rate for
non-merit goods and services was placed at 10.3 per cent in 1994-95, with the recovery rate for
4center being slightly higher at 12.1 percent than 9.3 percent for states.  Statewise recovery rates
are shown in Table 8.
The paper suggests reforms in present regime of subsidies with the objective of reducing
the overall scale of subsidies, making them transparent, and using them for well defined
economic objectives and focussing on final goods and services with a view to maximizing their
impact on the target population at minimum cost, instituting systems for periodic reviews and
setting clear limits on the duration of any new subsidy schemes. The existing subsidy rate for
non-merit goods and services for center and states together is nearly 90 percent of the cost.
Bringing this down to 50 percent could reduce subsidies on non-m rit goods and services from
10.7 percent of GDP to about 6.0 percent of GDP and reduce the combined fiscal deficit of
center and states from 6.5 percent of GDP in 1996-97 to less than 2 percent of GDP. The Report
suggests setting a target for reducing the subsidy rate for non-merit subsidies to 50 percent in a
three-year period and further to 25 percent in the next two years. The key to subsidy reduction
lies in phased increase in user charges in sectors such as power, transport, irrigation, agriculture
and education.
In view of the need to significantly step-up investments in the infrastructure sector,
(power, ports, telecommunications, highways and roads) state governments are required to
undertake appropriate policy reforms so as to attract a high order of private sector participation.
Also, it may be pointed out here that serious infrastructure constraints can only be overcome if
the central government creates a regulatory and economic environment conducive to large-scale
inflows of foreign investment.  Most importantly, the central government needs to empower the
state governments to negotiate infrastructure projects with prospective foreign investors
according to basic norms, but without central government interference that now contribute to
long and cumbersome approval procedures.  While a process of empowering state governments
in this regard began under the 13-party United Front government, there still is a long way to go
in this direction.
Responding to the emerging fiscal challenges, in recent years, a number of states have
moved towards introducing long-term structural reforms in their finances in order to broaden the
tax base and redress the imbalances in their expenditure patterns.  It may be pointed out,
however, that these reforms have yet to make any significant improvement in the state of state
finances since they have been partially implemented, and are extremely slow moving.  A number
of state governments, including Kerala, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh have
undertaken measures to reform their sales tax system and simplified their administrative structure
to mobilize higher levels of revenue.  A number of states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Himachal
Pradesh, Goa, Haryana, Kerala and Orissa have sought to encourage private sector participation
in the transport and power generation sectors.
Some states have also provided a certain degree of autonomy to the power sector by
setting up an independent State Electricity Regulatory Commission.  We discuss the state
electricity boards and their impact on state finances later on in the paper.  Some states, such as
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Punjab have privatized octroi tax collection in order to ensure
revenue buoyancy.  A more efficient tax system based on value-added taxation rather than
turnover taxes, and inefficient internal trade taxes such as the Octroi could raise tax revenues
5while lower effective tax rates.  Against the overall backdrop of deteriorating financial position
of states, the budget estimates of states for 1997-98 eflect corrective efforts by some state
governments.  This is evident from the scaling down, in nominal terms, of some major deficit
indicators, especially the consolidated revenue deficit and a step-up i  their direct capital outlay.
Intergovernmental Transfers in India:
In India, as in any federation, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities and the
division of tax powers form the basic foundation of intergovernmental fiscal relations.  One of
the significant features of financial transfers from the center to the states in India is that there
exist a number of channels for such transfers to take place.  While the Finance Commission3
makes recommendations for transfers which are restricted to the states’ non-plan requirements in
the current (revenue) account, the Planning Commission, on the other hand, makes
recommendations for transfers to the states by way of grants and loans to meet their plan
requirements.  In addition to these two channels, various central ministries of the central
government make specific purpose transfers with or without matching requirements.  In this
section, we propose to raise some issues relating to restructuring of India’ s complex system of
intergovernmental transfers.  Restructuring of center-state fiscal relations, in our view, is
essential in order to achieve sound fiscal consolidation.
The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, Article 246, provides for three lists:
these are the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List.  In the Union list, or under the
exclusive domain of the center are all matters relating to currency, banking and finance, defense,
foreign affairs, including economic relations with foreign entities, matters affecting the country
as a whole, and those relating to interstate relations.  Under the State List are matters closely
connected with the life and welfare of the population, such as local government, public health,
infrastructure, land, agriculture, and water management.  Finally, on the Concurrent List are
matters relating to law, marriage, succession, personal law, transfer of property other than
agricultural land, economic and social planning, trade unions, social security, education,
electricity, and production of, and trade in, products of any industry deemed by the Parliament as
best controlled by the center.
In practice, however, this classification does not describe the real picture as it exists.  By
and large, the center ultimately prevails in several important areas where central control or
intervention is considered to be expedient in the public interest by the Parliament.  For instance,
although industries is a category on the state list, the center is given power to legislate over
industries - the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in
the public interest4.  Similarly, in the areas where concurrent powers are to be exercised, if a law
is enacted by a state which is contradictory to any provision of law enacted by the center in the
same area, then, the former will become null and void and the latter will prevail.  In effect, the
Concurrent List is used by the center to abridge the freedom of action of the states.
                                                          
3  A five member Finance Commission, to be appointed every five years, was to make recommendations on: a) distribution
between the center and the states of proceeds of taxes collected by the center; and b) the principles which should govern the
grants-in-aid of revenues of the states.
4  Through the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, the center has assumed control over almost all-important industries,
leaving the states with very limited initiative.
6With regard to the assignment of tax powers, the Constitution gave the center the power
to levy income tax on non-agricultural income, both individual and corporate, customs duties,
and all excise taxes on production, except those on liquor.  On the other hand, the states were
assigned tax revenues related to land revenue, agricultural income tax, sales tax, except those on
interstate trade, excises on liquor, taxation of inland transport, except railways, property tax, and
the entry tax.  Since the most important and productive taxes were assigned to the center, the
Constitution provided for sharing of central taxes between the center and the states.  Provision
was also made for giving grants-in-aid to states in need of assistance.  Accordingly, income tax
and excise duties collected by the center were to be shared with the states on the basis of the
recommendations of the Finance Commission.
Beginning in 1952, ten Finance Commissions have been appointed so far.  Gross revenue
transfers during 1990-95 from the center to the states, under the aegis of the Finance
Commission,  have constituted about 60 percent of the total transfers. Tables 9 gives the shares
to states of the shareable taxes as recommended by the different Finance Commissions.   In the
recent years, state finances have been helped by improved buoyancy in the central transfers.  In
1997-98 gross transfer of resources from the center would finance 41.7 percent of aggregate
disbursements of states as compared with 41.2 percent in 1996-97 and 39.1 percent in 1995-96.
This trend would be further strengthened with the proposed change as recommended by the TFC.
Table 10 gives data on the devolution and transfer of resources from the center to the states.
The Tenth Finance Commission (1995-2000) has recommended an alt rnative scheme
for pooling of central taxes for devolution to the states.  Some of the main features of the
proposed alternative scheme are: a) the states should be allocated a share of the aggregated pool
comprising the gross tax revenue of the center as against the earlier practice of allocating
specified shares of center’ s r venue from only income tax and excise duties; b) taxes listed in
Articles 268 and 269 of the Constitution, other than central sales tax and consignment tax, shall
form part of the proposed central pool; c) the share of the states be fixed at 29 percent; and d) the
proposed ratio of 29 percent on the basis of which the states allocation will be determined out of
the central pool shall be reviewed after 15 years.  The Tenth Finance Commission (TFC) arrived
at the figure of 29 percent keeping the following in view: first, shares in income taxes, basic
excise duties, and the grant in lieu of the tax on railway passenger fares have together amounted
to an average of 24.3 percent during the quinquennium, 1990-95; second, including the potential
from taxes envisaged in Articles 268 and 269, it will be reasonable to mark up this proportion to
26 percent; and finally, the share of additional excise duties have together amounted to an
average of 2.9 percent during 1990-955.
The recommendations of the TFC are a major departure from what the earlier Finance
Commissions had been recommending.  The idea of pooling of central taxes, and allocating a
share of the aggregated pool for devolution to the states seems to be a sensible one.  It will not
only allow the states to share the aggregate buoyancy of central taxes, but will also be
instrumental in partly removing the disincentives for the center to collect on the particular taxes
                                                          
5 The Commission recommended that an additional 3 percent be allocated to the states in lieu of the additional excise duties the
center is currently obliged to levy in lieu of the sales tax on three commodities (sugar, tobacco, and textiles) that the states have,
under a tax rental arrangement, agreed not to impose.  Further, as per the TFC,  the tax rental arrangement is to be terminated,
and the additional excise duties be merged with basic excise duties.
7which it has to share with the states, that is, the income tax and the union excise duties6.  O the
issue of debt relief to the states, the TFC has come up with two interesting schemes.  The
Commission has evolved a scheme of linking debt relief to improvements in the ratio of revenue
receipts to revenue expenditures in the states and another which links debt relief to debts retired
through the disinvestment of equity in state public enterprises.
The TFC has suggested continuation with the gap-filling system7.  This approach
discourages states to adhere to fiscal discipline.  Currently, grants  are given to the states under
Article 275 to fill the residual gap of state budgets.  With growing state expenditure levels on the
one hand, and inadequate resource mobilization on the other, more and more states have
regressed into the post-devolution deficit category.  This is a classic case of a soft-budget
constraint at the level of state finances.  The gap filling system should be eliminated since as
long as the states can fall back upon the center, there won’t be any compulsion on the states to
manage their finances efficiently.  The deficit states should be required to cut inessential
government spending so as to bridge the gap on their own resources.
After the establishment of the Planning Commission, and with development planning
gaining emphasis, the scope of the Finance Commission’s recommendation was reduced.  Over
the years, the Planning Commission has become a major fund transferring body to the states.
Plan grants rose from being Rs. 20.5 billion or 24.4 percent of total transfers to the states during
the Fourth Plan (1969-74) to Rs. 320.3 billion or 35.1 percent of total transfers during the
Seventh Plan (1985-90). Transfers from the Planning Commission to the states consist of both
grants and loans to finance their plan schemes.  Since 1969, plan assistance is being made on the
basis of the Gadgil formula8.  T ble 11 gives the formula for distributing state plan assistance.
According to the formula, 30 percent of the funds available for distribution by the Planning
Commission are earmarked for ten special category states9, and is given on the basis of plan
projects formulated by them, with 90 percent of assistance given by way of grants, and the rest as
loans.  The remaining 70 percent of funds available for the rest of the fifteen states (of which, 70
percent of assistance is given by way of loans, and the rest as grants) is distributed in accordance
with the following: 60 percent weight assigned to population, 25 percent to per capita SDP, 7.5
percent to fiscal management, and the remaining 7.5 percent to special problems faced by these
states.
It is noteworthy, therefore, that plan transfers given to the states for plan purposes, and
also for their grant-loan components, are determined independently of the required plan
investments, their sectoral composition, the resources available to the states, or their fiscal
performance.  Data relating to states’ plan resources before statutory transfers (in per capita
terms) under the Seventh Plan show that among the major states, except for Maharashtra and
Gujarat, the resources available with the states for plan investments were negative.  Such deficits
                                                          
6 According to the budget for 1997-98, the government has accepted the new devolution formula of the TFC.
7 Gap filling involves grants from the center to the states in cases where there are revenue deficits in the non-plan accounts of
states after the devolution of shareable taxes.
8 The formula and its periodic modifications are evolved on the basis of consensus in the National Development Council (NDC).
The NDC consists of the cabinet ministers of the central government, chief ministers of the states, and the members of the
Planning Commission, and is chaired by the Prime Minister.
9 These are: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim, and Tripura.
8were much higher in the low-income states, such as Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Madhya Pradesh.  The relatively richer states, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab, and
Haryana had access to larger non-plan loans, and as they could get central plan assistance, per
capita plan outlays in these states were almost twice those in the middle and low-income states.
The third component of transfers from the center to the states is for specifi d purpo es
with or without matching provisions.  These are called the central sector or the centrally
sponsored schemes.  Grants for the central sector schemes are given to the states to undertake
certain agency functions and are, therefore, entirely financed by the central government.
Centrally sponsored schemes, on the other hand, are initiated in regard to services falling within
the states’ jurisdiction to ensure that optimal levels of services are provided.  These are shared
cost programs, and the matching ratios vary from project to project, but are uniform across states.
These schemes have attracted a great deal of criticism from the states, and are seen by the states
as an unwarranted intrusion into their domain by the central government. Volume of such
assistance formed about 36 percent of the total plan assistance and 17 percent of total current
transfers in 1992-93.
In sum, the intergovernmental system of financial transfers in India suffers from a
number of weaknesses.  First, since there are multiple bodies engaged via different routes to
transfer funds from the center to the states, naturally there arise jurisdictional problems and
unclear objectives.  While the transfers from the Finance Commission (after the TFC’s
recommendations have been incorporated) are meaningful in the present context, those from the
Planning Commission are not.  With regard to the latter, a tenuous relationship exists between
the required plan investments and the plan transfers.  Centrally sponsored schemes, on the other
hand, have helped the center to have a greater say in the areas totally under the jurisdiction of the
states, and has thereby curtailed states from taking independent action.
Expenditure reform:
Although the ratio of state expenditure to GDP has reduced from 17 percent in 1990-91
to 16.6 per cent in 1996-97 and further to 15.7 percent in 1997-98, state government expenditure
levels are still very high.  In particular, since 1987, expenditure on account of higher wages and
salaries (post Fourth Pay Commission recommendations) to state government employees has
risen sharply.   Such expenditure for the state governments will rise still further since several
state governments have accepted the Fifth Pay Commission’ s recommendations10.  Although
these Pay Commission’ s recommendations are for the central government employees only,
however, once the salaries of the central government employees have been revised, the state
governments are under increasing pressure to revise the salaries of their employees.  The Fifth
Pay Commission’ s recommendations are expected to raise the non-developmental expenditure
of the state governments quite substantially.  The state expenditure on administrative services is
                                                          
10 The Fifth Central Pay Commission has recommended an over three-fold increase in basic pay, increase in  retirement age from
58 to 60 years, 30 percent cut in the workforce over a 10-year period,   abolition of 350,000 vacant posts, substantial hike in
allowances net of taxes, higher interest payments on provident fund and pensions and employment on contract basis wherever
possible for government employees.  The commission has recommended revised pay scales with effect from January 1, 1996.
9budgeted to rise by 44.3 percent on account of the revision of pay scales of government
employees following the Fifth Pay Commission awards.
According to estimates of a study by the Planning Commission, should all the state
governments raise the salaries of their employees in line with the Fifth Pay Commission, then the
states will have to shell out an additional Rs. 1000 billion as salaries and wages over the next
five years.11  The Planning Commission estimates also include higher salaries for quasi-
government employees, including staff of public sector undertakings (PSUs) and local bodies.
As mentioned earlier, the state governments’ wage bill even without the Fifth Pay Commission
awards, is the single biggest expenditure item for almost all state governments.  On an average,
all state governments, spend around 60 paise of every rupee earned as revenue on wages and
salaries.  In particular, states like Maharashtra (with 2.2 million employees), Andhra Pradesh (1.1
million employees), West Bengal (950,000 employees), Gujarat (620,000 employees), and
Kerala (520,000 employees) are likely to be the hit hard with these awards.
Reducing the size of the public administration could cut state government spending.  One
way to achieve a reasonable degree of success in this direction might be a freeze on new
employment, matched by normal attrition through retirement and death.  Existing functions could
easily be met through modest improvements in computerization and information systems. With a
policy of not filling vacancies arising due to retirement, resignation or death, the size of the civil
service would reduce on its own.  Interestingly enough, the United Front government not only
refused to accept the recommendation of a 30 percent cut in the workforce over a 10-year period,
but also declined to abolish 350,000 vacant posts.  It is noteworthy that recognizing the gravity
of the fiscal situation, the Pay Commission, for the first time, recommended cutting
governmental workforce, but as it turns out, its acceptance is not yet acceptable to the
government.  To make matters worse, on the contrary, while the government, in September 1997
not only accepted the Pay Commissions’s recommendations on pay increases, but also enhanced
them even further.
With respect to public debt of the state governments, there is one impo tant deux ex
machina that could substantially ameliorate the fiscal situation.  Privatization of state-owned
public enterprises could raise significant funds as a percent of GDP, which could be used to buy
down the state public debt.  Not only would the stock of debt itself be reduced, but the interest
costs of servicing the debt would surely decline as the debt stock itself was brought under
control.  Public sector profits are dissipated in poor productivity, over manning, excessive public
sector salaries, soft budget constraints, and generally poor public-sector management.  For this
reason, sales of the enterprises to private sector buyers, if used to buy down the public debt,
would substantially ease the burden on state finances on account of interest payments on debt
and losses of state public sector enterprises.
In order to prune the state government spending levels further, there is need to reduce
subsidies to state public enterprises.  In particular, subsidies provided to the irrigation and power
enterprises have a strong bearing on the state budgets.  In fiscal year 1994-95, the state
government’s expenditure on account of bridging the gap between their operation and
                                                          
11 This estimate includes payment of arrears from January 1, 1996.  States like; West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar have
declined to pay these arrears.
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maintenance (O&M) expenditure and the recovery of user charges on water was Rs.94.3 billion,
about one percentage point of GDP.  The gap arises due to the fact that the state governments do
not align their water charges in accordance with the rising O&M costs.  Besides, a number of
state governments levy a fixed, very small amount of water charge (grossly inadequate when
compared to the cost of providing water) thereby lacking to achieve high collection rates of
water charges.
State Electricity Boards and State Finances:
 The Indian power sector has not been able to match the growing need for more power
generating capacity. Over the next five years, it needs to add 35,000 to 50,000 MW of capacity
depending on the growth rate of the economy, whereas it added no more than 20,000 MW over
the last five years.  The root cause of this inability to expand capacity is the financial sickness of
the state electricity boards (SEBs).  SEBs are responsible for generating and distributing power,
setting tariffs, and collecting revenues.  Almost all of them make losses and some are even
unable to pay for coal or the power they purchase.  This is due to the fact that SEBs implement
social subsidy policies of state governments, leading to inefficient patterns of energy
consumption, and even to non-recovery of their own costs.  Also, there is a lot of theft of power
from the distribution networks, which is classified in the official statistics as transmission and
distribution (T&D) losses.
 Since SEB electricity charges are set much below cost for the agricultural sector12, nit
revenue realization from the agricultural sector in none of the SEBs covers a reasonable fraction
of the unit average costs incurred by the SEBs.  As a result, the SEBs make huge losses, and are
in complete financial disarray.  In addition, the high T&D losses, placed around 21 percent13
make matters worse.  SEBs have huge payment arrears which they owe to the National Thermal
Power Corporation (NTPC) - from whom they buy power.  Over the years, the outstandings due
to NTPC from the SEBs have  risen to Rs. 49.5 billion, of which Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Bihar, and
Madhya Pradesh account for the bulk of the dues.  According to the revised estimates of 1996-
97, in absolute terms, the commercial losses of the SEBs stood at Rs.109 billion14.  The hidden
subsidy for the agriculture and domestic sectors has increased from Rs. 72 billion in 1991-92
(1.2 percent of GDP) to Rs. 192 billion in 1996-97 (1.4 percent of GDP) and is projected to
further go up to Rs. 215 billion in 1997-98 (1.5 percent of GDP)  The state governments come to
the rescue of SEBs by providing them with revenue subsidy along with capital transfers, which
include loans and equity.
The present structure of tariffs in electricity, involving extensive cross subsidization for
agriculture, has imposed disproportionate burden on paying customers.  This has led to decline in
consumption of power by high-tension users, with serious financial consequences for the SEBs.
With the present level of technical and organizational performance, most SEBs are loosing about
                                                          
12 Agricultural and industrial sectors accounted for 28 and 36 percent respectively of SEB electricity sale in 1995-96.  While the
tariff charged for the agricultural sector was  around one-fourth of a rupee per kWh, that for the industrial sector was over two
rupees per kWh.
13 This is much higher when compared to the international average of less than 10 percent for the developed countries.
14 The revised figure is given in the Economic Survey, 1996-97.  This is slightly over one percentage point as a proportion of
GDP.
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50 paisa to 1 rupee for every KWHR of power sold.  There is hardly any cap on operation and
maintenance (O&M) expenses and the SEBs seriously lack in managerial direction. Under these
circumstances, the SEBs need to revise their tariff rates in line with the costs they incur in the
production and distribution of electricity, in particular for the agricultural sector, and minimize
the T&D losses15.  This, in turn, would allow the state governments to withdraw financial
support to the SEBs, and would enable private investors to enter the electricity market on a much
larger scale. These measures will not only help restore the financial health of the SEBs, but
would also relieve the states of a burden that they should not be bearing in the first place.
Despite the tariff  revisions recently undertaken by seven SEBs (Andhra Pradesh,
Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Rajasthan) none of the SEBs
qualify for loans from the Power Finance Corporation (PFC)16 since the SEBs are not in a
position to meet PFC’ s mandatory requirement of a 3 percent rate of return.  In 1995-96, only
Tamil Nadu and Himachal SEBs recorded a 3 percent rate of return.  In order to meet the PFC’ s
mandatory requirement, three state governments had taken retrospective measures, such as
writing off loans to their respective SEBs17.  Similarly, the Kerala State Planning Board had
decided to make allocations totaling Rs. 310 million to compensate the Kerala SEB for
subsidized sale of power to the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Such actions on the part of  state governments are not solutions for the SEBs financial
problems.  The state governments have to put an end to the bailing out of the SEBs.  These
bailouts temporarily relieve the SEBs of their financial problems, but at the same time add
significantly to the burden on state finances.  At a minimum, what is required is that the SEBs
should be converted into corporations and should raise their tariff rates in line with their cost
structure18.  More extensive reforms would involve a regulatory overhaul of the entire system, to
allow private electricity producers to enter the grid on a competitive market basis.  These
changes would be instrumental in helping cut the state governments expenditures.
Concluding remarks:
India’s experience with economic reforms undertaken so far has made it quite clear that a
sound macroeconomic situation of low inflation along with high growth will not be achieved on
a sustainable basis unless substantial fiscal adjustments are undertaken, both by the central and
the state governments.  Fiscal deficits have remained high in the states, and a large component of
these is made up of revenue deficits.  Quite evidently, both expenditure and tax reforms have a
long way to go in the states.  The state expenditure-GDP ratio needs to be brought down
considerably.  Also, the composition of state government spending is still skewed towards
unproductive, current expenditures and  away from basic infrastructure as well as vitally needed
spending on human resource development (especially basic education and health).   To a large
                                                          
15 Seven SEBs have raised their tariff rates recently for 1996-97, and have tried to increase the minimum tariff applied to the
agriculture sector. Hike in the tariff structure ranges from 12 to 37 %.
16 The PFC offers a wide range of financial assistance for projects in renovation and modernization, transmission and distribution,
and SEB restructuring.
17 These are Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and Punjab.
18 The Orissa government has converted their SEB into corporations, and has set up an independent regulatory and tariff pricing
body.  The state government also proposes to corporatise and later privatize the distribution of power.
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extent, the responsibility of reducing fiscal imbalances lies with the states and a major effort on
their part is called for in order to retrieve the situation.
The three different methods of intergovernmental fiscal transfers have resulted in an
inefficient transfer mechanism, which has increased bureaucracy at the state level,
accommodated numerous interest groups, and delinked plan requirements of states from actual
transfers.  Similarly, better fiscal performance is not acknowledged with higher transfers, instead
the gap filling approach of the Finance Commission discourages fiscal discipline in states.
In the area of expenditure reduction, we have identified  several potential areas for
controlling expenditure of the state governments.  In our view, by raising user charges on water
in accordance with the costs incurred in providing water, and aligning tariff  rates of the SEBs in
line with their costs, the state governments could significantly cut their budgetary losses.  In
addition, a freeze on state government employment can help save scarce resources to be used for
productive purposes elsewhere in the states.
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Table 1
Basic Profile of States
Sources:  Ahluwalia and Little, Oxford University Press, 1998
Doing Business With India, Resource Directory and Reference Guide, 1997
Profiles of States, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt Ltd, 1997
 Dreze and Sen, Oxford University Press, 1995
State
Population
Area Density   Gender Literate Sectoral Share  1996-97 (%) in NSDP
1991 sq. km Persons/ Ratio Population
Millions 000's sq. kmF/1,000 M (% total)
Agriculture Manuf. Others
1.   Andhra Pradesh 66 275.1 241 972 44 34.82 9.36 55.82
2.   Arunachal Pradesh 1 83.7 - - 45 26.04 6.56 67.39
3.   Assam 2 78.4 285 922 52.9 35.29 5.61 59.1
4.   Bihar 86 173.9 496 910 38.5 31.17 14.22 54.61
5.   Goa 1 3.7 - - 76 9.15 32.63 58.21
6.   Gujarat 41 196 210 934 61.3 20.51 35.9 43.59
7.   Haryana 16 44.2 372 865 55.9 41.91 20.42 37.67
8.   Himachal Pradesh 5 55.7 92 975 63.9 - - -
9.   Jammu & Kashmir 8 222.2 34 922 30.1 - - -
10. Karnataka 45 191.8 234 959 56 32.59 18.31 49.10
11. Kerala 29 38.9 748 1036 89.8 31.15 13.46 55.40
12. Madhya Pradesh 66 443.5 149 931 44.2 41.40 15.31 43.29
13. Maharashtra 79 307.7 256 933 64.9 17.41 28.84 53.75
14. Manipur 2 22.3 - - 61 - - -
15. Meghalaya 2 22.4 - - 48 23.55 4.17 72.28
16. Mizoram 1 21.1 - - 81.2 - - -
17. Nagaland 1 15.6 - - 61.3 - - -
18. Orissa 32 155.7 203 970 49.1 26.50 14.69 58.80
19. Punjab 20 50.4 402 881 58.5 45.21 21.51 33.28
20. Rajasthan 44 342.2 128 909 38.6 44.52 8.70 46.78
21. Sikkim 0.4 7.1 - - 56 - - -
22. Tamil Nadu 56 130.1 429 973 62.7 19.14 22.14 58.71
23. Tripura 3 10.5 - - 60 35.91 2.27 61.83
24. Uttar Pradesh 139 294.4 472 878 41.6 42.52 13.84 43.64
25. West Bengal 68 88.8 767 917 57.7 32.24 14.35 53.41
Union Territories
26. Andaman & Nicobar 0.3 8.3 - - 73.7 - - -
27. Chandigarh 0.6 - - - - - -
28. Dadra & Nagar Haveli 0.1 0.5 - - 39.5 - - -
29. Daman & Diu 0.1 0.1 - - 73.6 - - -
30. Delhi 9 1.5 - - 76.1 - - -
31. Lakshadweep 0.05 - - - - - - -
32. Pondicherry 0.8 - - - - - - -

* Figure for the year 1996-97 is Revised Estimate and for 1997-98 is Budget Estimate.

































































Budgetary Operations of State Governments
(Rupees million)






Gross Net Gross Net
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1980-81 37,130 17,150 24,880 13,140 4,870 8,970 -14,850
1985-86 75,210 47,990 45,810 32,240 -18,620 -16,880 -6,540
1989-90 154,330116,450 82,470 70,930 2,550 1,610 36,820
1990-91 187,870145,320 101,320 82,800 4,200 -720 53,090
1991-92 189,000157,460 79,560 101,230 -3,400 1,560 56,510
1992-93 208,920157,700 76,810 64,970 1,760 -18,290 51,140
1993-94 205,960162,630 48,180 52,100 5,910 4,620 38,120
1994-95 276,970235,070 84,840 94,590 480 -44,680 61,560
1995-96 @ 314,260266,950 94,940 101,920 160 -26,150 82,010
1996-97
(RE) @
418,450350,720 152,810 158,240 8,980 42,460 156,140
1997-98 (BE)
@
423,300345,530 112,420 89,580 .. -1,330 125,110
As Percentage to GDP at current Market Prices
GFD NFD GPD NPD MD CD RD
Average
1985-90 3.1 2.2 1.7 1.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.3
Annual
1990-91 3.5 2.7 1.9 1.5 0.1  – 1.0
1991-92 3.1 2.6 1.3 1.6 -0.1  – 0.9
1992-93 3.0 2.2 1.1 0.9  – -0.3 0.7
1993-94 2.5 2.0 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.5
1994-95 2.9 2.5 0.9 1.0  – -0.5 0.6
1995-96@ 2.9 2.4 0.9 0.9  – -0.2 0.7
1996-97
(RE) @
3.3 2.8 1.2 1.3  – 0.3 1.2
1997-98
(BE)@
2.9 2.4 0.8 0.6  –  – 0.9
RE Revised Estimates.  BE Budget Estimates. - Negligible
…Not Available
(-) Indicates Surplus
* Data pertain to 23 State Governments having accounts with  the Reserve Bank of India.
@ Provisional data relate to the budgets of 26 State Governments including the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
Note:  The Monetised deficit of State Governments refers to loans given to them by the RBI net of their deposits with
the RBI.
Source:  RBI data on State Government finances
* Figure for the year 1996-97 is Revised Estimate and for 1997-98 is Budget Estimate.
Revenue Def icit/Surplus of States


















































Financing of State Governments’ Gross Fiscal Deficit
 (Rupees million)

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1980-81 15,640 1840 19,650 37,130 239,590 169,800 29,880 17.6
(42.1) (5.0) (52.9) (100.0)
1985-86 57,570 10,100 7540 75,210 536,600 387,860 61,040 20.5
(76.6) (13.4) (10.0) (100.0)
1989-90 79,170 22,980 52,180 154,330 942,240 641,390 130,630 20.6
(51.3) (14.9) (33.8) (100.0)
1990-91 99,780 25,560 62,530 187,8701,102,890 741,170 156,180 20.6
(53.1) (13.6) (33.3) (100.0)
1991-92 93,730 33,050 62,220 189,0001,263,380 834,910 189,230 20.5
(49.6) (17.5) (32.9) (100.0)
1992-93 89,210 35,000 84,710 208,9201,421,780 924,120 224,240 20.1
(42.7) (16.8) (40.5) (100.0)
1993-94 95,330 36,200 74,430 205,9601,600,7501,019,450 260,560 19.8
(46.3) (17.6) (36.1) (100.0)
1994-95 147,600 40,750 88,620 276,9701,845,2701,167,050 301,330 19.3
(53.3) (14.7) (32.0) (100.0)
1995-96 * 148,010 49,590 116,660 314,2602,107,8701,315,060 350,920 19.2
(47.1) (15.8) (37.1) (100.0)
1996-97 (RE)
*
190,630 54,950 172,870 418,4502,445,1901,505,690 405,870 19.4
(45.6) (13.1) (41.3) (100.0)
1997-98 (BE)
*
217,010 59,250 147,040 423,3002,830,8901,722,700 465,120 19.5
(51.3) (14.0) (34.7) (100.0)
RE Revised Estimates.  BE Budget Estimates.
# Include loans from Financial Institutions, Provident Funds, Reserve Funds, Deposits and Advances, etc.
$ Include internal debt, loans and advances from the Central Government and Provident funds, etc.
* Provisional data relate to the budgets of 26 State Governments including the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
Note:
1.  Figures in parentheses are percentages to the Gross Fiscal Deficit.  2.  Data on outstanding loans and advances from the
Centre take into account medium-term loans of Rs. 1,743 crore in 1982-83, Rs. 400 crore in 1983-84 and Rs. 1,628 crore in
1985-86 given by the Centre to States to clear their overdrafts.  3.  Data on outstanding liabilities of the State Governments have
been revised taking into account the latest available information.
Source:  Budget Documents of State Governments and Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Union and State
Governments.







Share in Central Taxes
Grants from Center
States' non-tax receipt

















Select Budgetary Variables of States Governments
   (Per cent)




1 2 3 4 5 6
1. GFD/GFD Expenditure 19.4 21 18.7 14.9 19.6
2. Revenue Deficit/Revenue
Expenditure




-0.1 2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.6
4. Revenue Deficit/GFD 29.6 27.3 26.1 24.8 7.7
5. Non-Dev. Exp./Revenue
Receipts




17.7 16.9 16 14.4 11
7. States' Tax
Revenue/GDP
5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7
8. States' Non Tax
Revenue/GDP
1.6 1.9 2.1 2 2
RE Revised Estimates. BE Budget Estimates.
$ Provisional data relate to 26 State Governments including the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
(-) Indicates surplus.
GFD Gross Fiscal Deficit. Non-Dev. Exp.Non-Developmental Expenditure.
Source: Budget Documents of the State Governments and RBIdata on state finances.
Table 5
















Total Receipts 21.9 28.7 24.1 19.8 37 41.6 71.2 24.2 28.9 24.3 17.6 31.7 25.0 30.3 20.0 24.2 20.3
  Revenue receipt 16.9 22.8 19.0 16.2 31.6 28.7 64.2 19.4 21.4 19.6 13.0 23.3 18.1 23.0 15.7 16.9 14.2
    Tax revenue 11.8 10.2 13.0 12.1 9.9 14.8 21.1 14.4 16.6 11.6 9.7 12.6 10.1 12.8 13.5 10.9 10.9
      State’s own tax revenue 8.2 4.6 5.1 9.9 8.4 6.9 6.5 11.5 12.4 7.1 8.2 5.5 8.8 8.0 10.1 5.9 7.4
      Share in Central taxes 3.6 5.6 7.8 2.3 1.4 7.9 14.6 3.0 4.2 4.4 1.6 7.1 1.4 4.8 3.4 4.9 3.5
    Non-tax revenue 5.1 12.6 6.1 4.0 21.7 13.9 43.0 5.0 4.8 8.0 3.3 10.8 8.0 10.3 2.2 6.0 3.2
      State’s own non-tax revenue 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 20.4 2.0 3.9 2.6 1.7 3.6 2.4 3.7 6.7 4.9 1.0 2.2 0.8
      Grants from the Centre 2.4 10.0 3.4 1.3 1.3 11.9 39.2 2.4 3.1 4.4 1.0 7.1 1.3 5.4 1.3 3.8 2.4
  Capital receipt 5.0 5.9 5.1 3.6 5.4 12.9 7.0 4.8 7.5 4.7 4.6 8.4 6.9 7.3 4.3 7.3 6.1
    Internal Debt 1.0 1.8 1.3 0.1 0.5 1.6 3.2 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.5 1.9 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9
      Market loan 1.0 1.1 1.2 - 0.5 0.8 1.3 0.5 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.7 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8
    Loans & advances from the Centre 3.3 3.9 3.0 2.1 1.9 8.9 4.3 3.2 3.7 2.1 1.4 3.7 4.2 2.7 2.5 4.1 3.7
      State plan schedule 2.0 0.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 3.7 1.2 2.0 1.2 0.7 2.2 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.9
      Central plan schemes - 0.2 - - - - - - - - - 0.1 - - - - -
    Other capital receipts 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.1 2.9 2.5 - 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.7 2.8 1.1 3.3 1.0 2.2 1.5
Total Expenditure 21.9 28.3 24 20.1 37 45.1 74.7 24.1 28.7 23.9 18.0 31.7 24.8 30.6 20.1 23.9 20.2
  Education, sports, etc. 3.3 5.5 4.7 3.4 2.5 7.3 10.5 4.0 6.6 3.7 2.7 5.3 2.6 5.1 3.8 3.8 3.8
  Medical & public health 1.0 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.6 2.9 4.4 1.3 1.9 1.2 0.7 1.5 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.1
  Water supply & sanitation - 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 2.3 4.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 3.3 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.3
  Housing - 0.1 - 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.1
  Urban development - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.6
  Agri. & allied services 1.0 2.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 4.9 5.1 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.6 1.8 0.9 1.0
  Rural development 1.2 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.1 1.0 2.8 0.1 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.4
  Irrigation & flood control 2.5 1.2 1.1 2.3 3.1 0.8 2.3 2.8 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.9 0.8 2.9 0.5 1.9 0.7
  Energy 0.2 - 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 7.9 0.6 0.1 0.9 1.6 1.8 0.1 1.6 - - 1.3
  Transport & communication 0.6 1.5 0.5 0.7 1.7 2.8 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.5
  Interest payments 2.5 3.8 4.4 2.6 2.4 5.2 8.0 2.5 3.6 2.7 2.0 4.5 4.1 3.6 2.3 4.1 2.7
  Others 9.1 10.5 7.3 6.0 22.1 15.4 28.8 8.1 10.8 8.1 4.8 9.5 13.5 9.5 8.6 9.2 6.8
* State Government’s Receipt & Expenditure and NSDP figures are for the year 1993-94
Sources: Economic Survey: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, 1996-97
Profiles of States, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt Ltd, March 1997
Table 5a
Statewise Major Fiscal Indicators
               (Per cent)

























I  Non Special Category
1.    Andhra Pradesh
2.    Bihar
3.    Goa
4.    Gujarat
5.    Haryana
6.    Karnataka
7.    Kerala
8.    Madhya Pradesh




13.  Tamil Nadu
14.  Uttar Pradesh
15.  West Bengal
16.  NCT Delhi
Non-Special Category States
II.  Special Category
1.    Arunachal Pradesh
2.    Assam
3.    Himachal Pradesh
4.    Jammu and Kashmir
5.    Manipur
6.    Meghalaya
7.    Mizoram
8.    Nagaland






































































































































































































































































































































Special Category States 9.6 9.4 9.1 9.2 18.4 13.4 11.6 11.6 -30.1 -74.5 -57.8 -61.5
All States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 19.7 19.0 21.0 20.6 7.7 24.6 37.9 33.6
Agg Dis :  Aggregate Disbursements
GFD :  Gross Fiscal Deficit
GFD Exp :  Gross Fiscal Deficit Expenditure
R.E. :  Revised Estimates
B.E. :  Budget Estimates
NCT :  National Capital Territory
Avg :  Average
Source:  RBI, Finances of State Governments
Table 5b
State-wise Major Fiscal Indicators
(Per cent)

























I.  Non Special Category
1.    Andhra Pradesh
2.    Bihar
3.    Goa
4.    Gujarat
5.    Haryana
6.    Karnataka
7.    Kerala
8.    Madhya Pradesh




13.  Tamil Nadu
14.  Uttar Pradesh
15.  West Bengal
16.  NCT Delhi
Non Special Category
States
II.  Special Category
1.    Arunachal Pradesh
2.    Assam
3.    Himachal Pradesh
4.    Jammu and Kashmir
5.    Manipur
6.    Meghalaya
7.    Mizoram
8.    Nagaland






































































































































































































































































































































Special Category States 28.8 31.5 35.4 35.5 11.1 13.6 12.9 13.5 13.8 13.2 11.7 12.9
All States 29.8 32.0 39.7 44.1 10.8 13.6 15.3 16.2 43.4 42.2 41.8 44.2
Rev. Receipts :  Revenue Receipts
Int. Pay :  Interest Payments
Rev. Exp. :  Revenue Expenditure
Non-Dev Rev. Exp.:  Non Developmental Revenue Expenditure
Source:  RBI, Finances of State Governments
Table 5c
State-wise Major Fiscal Indicators

























I.  Non Special Category
1.    Andhra Pradesh
2.    Bihar
3.    Goa
4.    Gujarat
5.    Haryana
6.    Karnataka
7.    Kerala
8.    Madhya Pradesh




13.  Tamil Nadu
14.  Uttar Pradesh
15.  West Bengal
16.  NCT Delhi
Non Special Category
States
II.  Special Category
1.    Arunachal Pradesh
2.    Assam
3.    Himachal Pradesh
4.    Jammu and Kashmir
5.    Manipur
6.    Meghalaya
7.    Mizoram
8.    Nagaland






































































































































































































































































































































Special Category States 11.1 10.2 12.3 12.6 76.5 71.2 73.7 73.3 14.0 16.8 12.0 11.2
All States 15.3 15.8 13.8 12.5 45.3 40.1 41.3 41.3 22.8 24.0 25.0 25.2
Non Tax Rev Exp:  Non Tax Revenue Expenditure
Source:  RBI, Finances of state governments
Table 6

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
I.  Developmental Expenditure
Revenue and Capital (A+B)
A.  Social Services (1 to 11)
1.  Education, sports, art and
culture
2.  Medical and public health and
family welfare
3.  Water supply and sanitation
4.  Housing
5.  Welfare of Scheduled Caste,
Scheduled Tribes and other
Backward Classes
6.  Labour and Labour welfare
7.  Social Security and Welfare
8.  Nutrition
9.  Relief on account of Natural
Calamities
10.  Urban development
11.  Others*
B.  Economic Services (1 to 9)
1.  Agriculture and Allied
Activities
2.  Rural Development
3.  Special Area Programmes
4.  Irrigation and Flood Control
5.  Energy
6.  Industry and Minerals
7.  Transport and
Communications
8.  Science, Technology and
Environment
9.  General Economic Services




A.  Social Services (1 to 3)
1.  Housing
2.  Government Servants
(Housing)
3.  Others @
B.  Economic Services (1 to 7)
1.  Co-operation
2.  Crop Husbandry
3.  Soil and Water Conservation
4.  Power Projects
5.  Village and Small Industries
6.  Other Industries and Minerals
7.  Others +













































































































































































































































































1.  Figures in brackets are percentage to total developmental expenditure.
2.  Figures for 1995-96 (Accounts) in respect of Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland relate to Revised Estimates
*   Includes expenditures on information and publicity.
+   Includes loans and advances for forest, fisheries, animal husbandry, road and water transport services, etc.
@  Includes outlay on education, art and culture, urban development, social security and welfare, etc.
Source:  RBI, Finances of state governments
Table 7





% of Total Non-Merit
(Millions)
% of Total
1.   Andhra Pradesh
2.   Bihar
3.   Goa
4.   Gujarat
5.   Haryana
6.   Karnataka
7.   Kerala
8.   Madhya Pradesh


















































































Source:  Government Subsidies in India, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 1997
Table 8
Profile of Recovery Rates
Sectors/ServicesState




1.   Andhra Pradesh
2.   Bihar
3.   Goa
4.   Gujarat
5.   Haryana
6.   Karnataka
7.   Kerala
8.   Madhya Pradesh


















































































Source:  Government Subsidies in India, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 1997
Table 9
Tax Shares of States



































a:  Restricted to excise duties on tobacco, matches and vegetable products.
b:  In addition to (a), sugar, coffee, tea, paper, and vegetable
c:  All commodities yielding Rs. 5 million of excise revenue per year except motor spirits.
d: All excisable commodities
e: 5 percent earmarked for deficit states.
f: 7.42 percent earmarked for deficit states.
g: 7.5 percent earmarked for deficit states.
Table 10
Devolution and Transfer of Resources from the Centre
Variations











Estimates) Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Amount Per cent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
I.  States’ Share in Central Taxes
II.  Grants from the Centre (1 to 5)
1.  State Plan Schemes
2.  Central Plan Schemes
3.  Centrally Sponsored Schemes
4.  Special Plan Schemes
5.  Non Plan Grants (a to c)
a) Statutory Grants
b) Grants for Natural Calamities
c) Non-Plan Non-Statutory Grants
III.  Gross Loans from the Centre (i+ ii)
    i)  Plan Loans
    ii) Non-Plan Loans*
IV.  Gross Transfer (I + II + III)
V.  Repayment and Interest Payments
Liabilities (a + b)
a) Repayment of Loans to the Centre
b) Interest Payments on the Loans  from
the Centre






















































































































































































@ Figure for Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland relate to Revised Estimates.
*  Includes Ways and Means Advances from the Centre.
Source:  Reserve Bank of India
Table 11
Formula for distributing state plan assistance









(1) (2) (3) (4)
A.  Special Category States (10
B.  Non-Special Category States (15)
(i)   Population (1971)
(ii)  Per capita income of which
(a) According to the ‘deviation’ method
covering only the States with per
capita income below the national
average
(b) According to the ‘distance’ method
covering all the 15 States





















1) The formula as revised in December, 1991.
2) Fiscal Management is assessed as the difference between
states’ own total plan resources estimated at the time of
finalizing annual plans and their actual performance on the
basis of the last five years.
3) Under the criterion of the performance with regard to certain
programmes of national priority, the approved formula
covers four objectives, namely (I) population control, (ii)
elimination of illiteracy, (iii) completion of externally aided
projects on schedule and (iv) success in land reforms.
SOURCE:  Ahluwalia and Little, Oxford University Press, 1998
Table 12





























Source:  National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
